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Abstract of IS THE MARINE CORPS' DOCTRINE OF MANEUVER WARFARE SYNERGETIC WITH THE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS?
The Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver warfare is compared with the joint doctrine for amphibious warfare. The purpose of this paper is to determine if the Marine Corps'
Warfighting FMFM-l and the Joint Doctrine for Amphibious
Operations JCS Pub 3-02 are compatible. The joint doctrine for amphibious operations is examined at the operational level to determine if the concept supports maneuver warfare.
The validity of amphibious operations or the maneuver warfare doctrine are not discussed. The joint doctrine for amphibious operations and the doctrine of maneuver warfare are synergetic. The commanders' judgement, mindset, and knowledge de rmine if maneuver warfare will be used in amphibious operations.
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IDTIC Tp DI Un I bu t t Dis "Warfare by maneuver stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on. 3 The goal is to apply strength against the enemy's weakness through speed and surprise.
"The object of maneuver is not so much to destroy physically as it is to shatter the enemy's cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance., 4 In the past the United States enjoyed numerical and technological superiority. This kind of advantage supported the style of attrition warfare the United States relied on in the past wars. As the potential enemies become stronger and more advanced technologically this style of warfare can no longer be counted on to win the future wars.
Expeditionary situations that the Marine Corps is most likely to find itself involved require a concept with which the United States can win quickly, with minimum casualties and limited external support, against a larger foe on his h,--"e soil. 5 History suggests that God is on the side of the bigger battalion --unless the smaller battalion has a better idea. 6 Based on this perception the Commandant established the doctrine of maneuver warfare. There is even a feeling that until the publication of FMFM-1 both the Marine Corps and the Navy subscriled to attrition warfare, a carry over from the successful amphibious campaigns of World War 1I. 4 An amphibious operation is an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore. 5 There are four types of amphibious operations. The amphibious assault is the principle type and involves establishing a force over a hostile shore. The amphibious withdrawal involves extracting forces from a hostile beach by sea in naval ships or craft.
The amphibious raid involves a swift incursion into, or a temporary occupancy of, an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal. The amphibious demonstration is an operation conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. Additionally, it is felt that until certain technological developments are purchased, such as the Osprey tilt rotor aircraft and the advanced assault amphibian vehicle (AAAV), maneuver warfare is not possible in amphibious operations. 1 2 As for these technological purchases while they would certainly enhance the tactics and techniques of the operation maneuver warfare can be and has been conducted without them. 1 3 Figuring how to get to the beach quicker and with stealth is not the essence of maneuver warfare. Shattering the enemy's will to fight and destroying his cohesion are the objectives. Targeting his command and control facilities, communications assets, or rear areas create uncertainty in the enemy's mind in his ability to resist. It can break up the whole in small parts.
Even if this equipment is purchased it may not solve the problem if used in the traditional way. 1 4 What is required is the application of the principles of maneuver warfare.
The OTH concept should not be viewed as the only way of conducting amphibious operations but as another option available to the commander.
Other critics of the current doctrine argue that massive firepower was required to conduct amphibious operations as if this violates the principles of maneuver warfare. 1 5 As we discussed above the decision to conduct advance force operations rests with the commander based on his judgement to forego surprise in favor of preparing the landing site for assault. The FMFM-1 states that suppressive effects of firepower are essential to the ability to 72aneuver. Fires should be concentrated at decisive points to destroy the enemy when the opportunity presents itself. 8 The key is that firepower is used to support maneuver instead of an unfocused aim of the physical destruction of the enemy. Another concern in the command and control area is the ability of the CATF to apply maneuver warfare principles to the amphibious operation. 3 It is pointed out that the CATF does not have the background in land warfare and needs to be educated. 4 There is a concern that the Navy tends to think at the tactical level while maneuver warfare takes place at the operational level. 5 The doctrine for amphibious operations clearly states that the CATF is responsible for the operation but it should be remembered that he has a landing force commander ( There is also a potential problem area in the termination of the amphibious operation. The JCS PUB states that instructions for the termination of the operation will be included in the initiating instructions. 6 Additionally, it describes the conditions that must be met in order to terminate. 7 In the amphibious assault termination is considered when the capture of the final ground objectives of the landing forces is accomplished. 8 These three references to termination could cause potential problems. In maneuver warfare the objective is not always physical. Furthermore if the CINC or JTF plans to dissolve or reassign the amphibious task forces upon termination then the landing force commander may become restricted by his logistics plan or use of his reserve forces. As we can see it is imperative that all levels of command understand the concept of operations as well as the conditions for termination.
As we stated above these areas of conflict do not necessarily require changes to the JCS PUB 3-02 but they can present problems. Service doctrine needs to be understood by all involved in joint operations at all levels.
Chapter V
Conclusion
Although some minor changes are needed to update the JCS PUB 3-02, the doctrine of maneuver warfare and the joint doctrine for amphibious operations are synergetic. What can also be concluded from this comparison is that the main problems in applying maneuver warfare stem from misunderstandings of both doctrines and a mindset to conduct business as usual. Ironically, it took an Army officer like General MacArthur to convince Navy and Marine planners that the landing at Inchon could be successful. No doubt it will be as hard to convince the planners of the future of the same kind of move that took place unless we educate all officers of all services and break out of this old mindset.
General Gray attempted this by publishing the FMFM-1 and requiring all officers to read and reread it. 1 For amphibious operations this is only part of the audience. The Navy plays a vital role in amphibious operations. It is imperative that all officers regardless of service understand the intent of maneuver warfare and how it can be used in amphibious operations.
